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Abstract
We conduct a laboratory study of the group-on group ultimatum bargaining with restricted
within-group interaction. In this context, we concentrate on the effect of different within-group
voting procedures on the bargaining outcomes. Our experimental observations can be summa-
rized in two propositions. First, individual responder behavior across treatments does not show
statistically significant variation across voting rules, implying that group decisions may be viewed
as aggregations of independent individual decisions. Second, we observe that proposer behavior
significantly depends (in the manner predicted by a simple model) on the within-group decision
rule in force among the responders and is generally different from the proposer behavior in the
one-on-one bargaining.
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1 Introduction
Many common bargaining situations, such as those that occur between states,
between branches of government or between legislative factions, between corpo-
rate management and shareholders, unions and employers, etc. involve interac-
tions between groups rather than between individuals. In such circumstances,
it is natural to believe that intra-group decision-making rules must a¤ect bar-
gaining outcomes. This theoretical observation is, of course, not new, dating,
in the context of international relations, back to, at least, Schelling (1980), who
conjectured that domestic ratication constraints might serve to strengthen the
executives position vis-a-vis foreign governments compared with what would
have obtained if such constraints didnt exist.
The application of this argument, of course, crucially depends on two
assumptions. Firstly, in order for the e¤ect of the explicit group decision-
making rules used to be clear, one needs to assume that these rules merely
aggregate individual decisions that, on their own, are not a¤ected by the ex-
plicit group decision-making rules postulated. Secondly, taking the former as
the case, the entire argument presumes that opposing negotiators are capa-
ble of internalizing the impact of their opponents internal decision-making
processes. Our present work is focused on empirically testing the latter part
of the argument: the ability of agents to react to the formal rules, regulating
the decision-making in the opposing camp.
We attempt to do this in a context of a laboratory study of ultimatum
bargaining.1 In this game, one side (the proposers) suggests how to partition a
total available payo¤ between itself and the other side (the responders), who,
in turn can accept or reject the proposal. In case of acceptance the proposal
is implemented, while in case of rejection neither side receives anything. As
is well-known, the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is for the ultimatum-
proposer to receive (almost) the entire surplus. In contrast, in laboratory
implementation of the game, ultimatum-responders consistently obtain a sig-
nicant, though smaller, share. We replace the unitary bargainers with two
sides, consisting of multiple subjects each. The group decision-making rules
among the responders vary across treatments and we concentrate on compar-
ing the proposer behavior that emerges when faced with di¤erently structured
1Our choice of the simplest possible bargaining procedure, originally introduced in the
lab by Güth et al. (1982), is mainly dictated by the ease of its experimental implementation
and by the straightforward interpretation of the experimental results in this setting. The
common regularities established by the vast experimental literature are summarized by Roth
(1995) and Camerer (2003).
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opponents. Given this objective, we would like to, as much as possible, avoid
the impact that belonging to a group using a certain rule to make a decision
might exert on individual behavior. For this reason we design an environment
in which subjects ability to communicate or create personal links is mini-
mized. In particular, responders vote on whether to accept or reject an o¤er
without any contact with other members of their group, without even knowing
their identity. We conjecture that in such a setting individual responder be-
havior would not depend on how the group decision is derived from individual
votes (something we shall explicitly test for). This, if true, would allow for a
clear comparison between the incentives faced by proposers facing responders
operating using di¤erent explicit rules.
Our experimental observations can be summarized in two propositions.
First, individual responder behavior across treatments does not, indeed, show
statistically signicant variation across treatments. Second, we observe that
proposer behavior signicantly depends (in the manner predicted by a simple
model) on the intra-group decision rule in force among the responders, and is
generally di¤erent from the proposer behavior in the one-on-one bargaining.
This suggests that subjects are able to internalize the di¤erent nature of the
responders across the treatments.
There does exist a notable literature on ultimatum bargaining between
groups. Thus, Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) have suggested that when the ul-
timatum game is played by unstructured groups of agents, rather than by
individuals, the division of the payo¤ is substantially a¤ected in favor of the
ultimatum-proposers, who seem to behave more aggressively, facing e¤ectively
more passive group opponents. Whether that e¤ect is due to the implicitly
emerging procedures among the responders or to changes in individual behavior
induced by group membership remains unclear. In general, the within-group
decision-making may be di¢ cult to observe or categorize, unless it is explicitly
imposed. But imposing some preference aggregation rule may have a direct
impact on the way the game is played, as suggested, at least for the case of the
trust game, by Song (2009). A distinct question is to what extent explicitly
imposed intra-group decision rules themselves matter for the behavior of the
opposing side. Here the evidence so far is extremely limited. In a previous
study by Messick et al. (1997), who, like us, limit the within-group interac-
tions, the answer seems to be negative: proposers behave the same, whatever
decision rule is imposed on the responders (though, given the low number
of observations in this study, the lack of statistically signicant di¤erence is,
at best, inconclusive). This result is echoed in Bosman et al. (2006), who
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observe no di¤erence between proposer behavior when faced with individual
or group responders in a similar power-to-take game (unlike us, they do ex-
plicitly allow and study communication within groups). While the previously
mentioned studies look at single-shot bargaining between inexperienced sub-
jects, Grosskopf (2003) studies behavior changes as agents learn from their
experience. Comparing one-on-one and one-on-group ultimatum bargaining
when unanimity is required for rejection (a rule similar to that in one of the
treatments in the previously cited work by Messick et al.) she nds that,
though the agents might not be able to gure out the di¤erence immediately,
with experience a clear di¤erence emerges between the play against groups
versus play against individuals (something that we also nd). In particular,
she observes that, when playing against groups requiring unanimity to reject,
proposers eventually learn to be more aggressive than when playing against
individuals. On the whole, the issue remains underexplored.
The results of this paper provide empirical support for the above-
mentioned Schellings (1980) conjecture and for the substantial theoretical
literature that grew out of it. Thus, for instance, Putnam (1988), in describ-
ing the linked problems of domestic politics and international negotiation,
explicitly notes the role of varying ratication procedures in bargaining situa-
tions; the same observation has been made formally, among others, by Haller
and Holden (1997), who concluded that the supermajority treaty ratication
requirement imposed by the U.S. constitution may, indeed, advantageously af-
fect that countrys negotiating positions. In a related context, Manzini and
Mariotti (2005) suggested that unanimity-based decision-rules within alliances
should make them more successful in negotiations compared with coalitions
governed by majority rule. The assumption that agents are cognizant of the
impact of intra-group institutions on inter-group bargaining is also implicit in
Romer and Rosenthal (1978 and 1979) work on political resource allocation, in
which the monopoly agenda-setter e¤ectively bargains with the median voter,
thus internalizing the majority voting used in a democracy. We believe that
our experimental ndings provide some support for the theoretical conclusions
of all of these papers. If the explicit rules are transformed by within-group
interaction a¤ecting individual choices, as suggested, for instance, by Song
(2009), or if the bargainers are unable to react to their opponents internal
structure, this would profoundly a¤ect the theoretical arguments here men-
tioned. We believe, our work indicates that, at least in an environment where
group members are united only by sharing the bargaining outcomes, the im-
plicit assumptions of much of the theoretical literature are sustained.
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Our work also relates to the empirical literature on intergroup inter-
action in games developed by social psychologists. Wildschut et al. (2003)
provide a meta-studyof a large body (involving some 130 papers) of exper-
imental evidence on what is known in psychology as the group discontinuity
e¤ect : the general tendency of groups of agents to behave more aggressively
than individuals in similar circumstances, whether due to social reinforcement
of aggressive behavior, greater anonymity within the group, or fear of aggres-
sive behavior by the opposing group. More recently, the issue has been taken
up by economists and economic psychologists, who compared the degree to
which group and individual play conforms to the game-theoretic predictions.
Thus, we have already mentioned a study by Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) on
group ultimatum games, while Bornstein et al. (2004) see earlier group exit in
the centipede game, both pointing towards the backward induction outcomes
of these games. Robert and Carnevale (1997) observe that in a group-on-
group ultimatum game that proposer groups tend to follow the preferences
of its most competitivemember.2 Similarly, Cox (2002) observes that in
an investment game group decisions correspond to those of their most aggres-
sive members, which makes them most closely game-theoretic in terms of
monetary payo¤s. Kocher and Sutter (2007) observe more aggressive group
behavior to prevail in a gift-exchange experiment even when group members
are not allowed any face-to-face interaction but reach a decision via a computer
communication protocol. In contrast, in a context of the dictator game Cason
and Mui (1997) observe that more generous (other-regarding) agents dominate
group decisions. Overall, the issue remains unsettled, and Camerer (2003) in-
cludes further study of the manner in which groups act in games as one of
the ten top open research questions in behavioral economics. In this work
we concentrate on what sort of di¤erence between group and individual play
could be ascribed to implicit preference aggregation rules within groups, which
might be emerging endogenously, when not explicitly imposed, even when no
real intra-group interaction, except through the decision rule and sharing the
common outcome, is involved.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 derives the
theoretical predictions of our experimental framework and discusses the ex-
perimental design; section 3 presents laboratory results; section 4 concludes.
2They elicit the individual preferences from observations of one-on-one play by the same
agents.
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2 The Model and Experimental Design
We start by providing a simple incomplete information model of ultimatum
bargaining, specied to the extent we shall be able to implement it in the lab.
We consider an environment, in which a monetary prize of  > 0 is to be shared
between the two sides: proposers and responders. In a one-on-one ultimatum
bargaining, the proposer has to choose a number x 2 [0; ] that she will o¤er
to the responder, with the balance of    x being left to herself. Following
Kennan and Wilson (1993), we model an asymmetric information game, in
which proposers do not observe the minimal o¤er size xr 2 [0; ], below which
a responder chooses to reject (the responders type). Proposers believe that
this xr is drawn from some probability distribution with the support [0; ]
with the distribution function F (x). Clearly, F (x) can be interpreted as the
acceptance probability of o¤er x, while P (x) = 1  F (x) is the probability of
rejection. If the proposer is an expected utility maximizer with the Bernoulli
utility function of nal wealth w given by u (w) ; then, if she o¤ers x, her
expected payo¤ is given by
(x) = u (   x) (1  P (x))
In what follows we shall assume that u and P are twice continuously
di¤erentiable with u0  0; u00  0 and P 0  0. In other words, we shall assume
that the proposer likes money, is either risk-neutral or risk-averse and believes
the probability of rejection to be decreasing in the o¤er size. We shall further
assume that P
 

2

= 0 (if you give at least as much to the responder as you
keep for yourself she always accepts) and P (0) = 1 (o¤ers of nothing are always
rejected), both of which are very robust empirical regularities observed in
ultimatum game experiments. These assumptions clearly imply impossibility
of corner solutions to the proposers maximization problem. The rst order
necessary condition for expected utility maximization in the interior (which is
easily seen to be su¢ cient if P (x) is convex at x) is
u0 (   x) (1  P (x)) =  u (   x)P 0(x)
It is worth noting, that at the optimum P (x) < 1 (since P (x) = 1
would guarantee a zero payo¤).
Consider now the same ultimatum bargaining between groups of three
proposers and three responders for a prize 3 (though we are not concentrating
on the proposers here, we chose to make them also consist of 3 subjects to
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maintain payo¤symmetry of the one-on-one bargaining). The proposersshare
of the prize will be divided equally between the proposers and the responders
share between the responders. An ultimatum x shall mean that each proposer
gets  x, and each receiver gets x. Under these conditions the pair (x;    x)
continues to completely describe the distribution of the monetary payo¤s in
case of acceptance.
In total we consider 4 di¤erent treatments: the control one-on-one ulti-
matum bargaining and 3 group-on-group treatments specied in terms of the
responder group voting rule.3 The following sums up the treatments:
Individual bargaining (I): one agent, the proposer, suggests a divi-
sion of a xed amount of money, and a second agent, the responder, accepts
or rejects it. If the responder rejects, no individual receives any pay, and if he
accepts, each individual receives the amount specied in the proposal
Unanimity with Rejection Default (URD): An o¤er is consid-
ered accepted when every member of the responder group votes to accept it.
Otherwise it is considered rejected.
Unanimity with Acceptance Default (UAD): An o¤er is consid-
ered rejected when every member of the responder group votes to reject it.
Otherwise it is considered accepted.
Majority Rule (MR): An o¤er is considered accepted when at least
two members of the responder group vote to accept it. Otherwise it is consid-
ered rejected.
Assuming individual responder behavior P (x) to be constant across
treatments (a key assumption that we are going to test), group rejection prob-
abilities and payo¤s should vary predictably with the group, as summarized
in the following table:
3We could have considered another alternative: the dictatorship (one agent chosen to
make the decision to accept or reject for the entire group). Charness and Jackson (2007),
found, in the context of the Stag Hunt game, that the dictator group-on-group game may
be played di¤erently from the one-on-one game (at least as far as equilibrium selection is
concerned) due to a feeling of responsibility on the part of the dictator. Likewise, Song
(2008) suggests that when individuals are intrusted with deciding for groups in the context
of the trust game, their behavior is a¤ected. We do not model it here though, so the dictator
rule would be equivalent to the one-on-one game.
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Treatment Probability of rejection Proposers expected utility: (x)
I P (x) u(   x)(1  P (x))
MR P 3(x) + 3P 2(x)(1  P (x)) u(   x)(1  P (x))2(1 + 2P (x))
UAD P 3(x) u(   x)(1  P 3(x))
URD 1  (1  P (x))3 u(   x)(1  P (x))3
The rst order necessary conditions for expected utility maximization,
simplied by noticing that P (x) < 1 in the optimum and dividing both sides
of the condition for the MR by (1  P (x)) > 0 and the condition for URD by
(1  P (x))2 > 0, are as follows:
Treatment FOC Expected Utility Maximization (simplied)
I u
0
(   x)(1  P (x)) =  u(   x)P 0(x)
MR u(   x)(1  P (x))(1 + 2P (x)) =  6u(   x)P 0(x)P (x)
UAD u(   x)(1  P 3(x)) =  3u(   x)P 0(x)P 2(x)
URD u(   x)(1  P (x)) =  3u(   x)P 0(x)
Without a further assumption on P , multiple local maxima are possi-
ble. Though global maximum, generically (in either P or u), would be unique,
multiplicity of local maxima might allow the global maximum to jumpde-
pending on the voting rule, which might create problems with identifying the
impact of the rules. Unfortunately we do not directly observe P . However,
the following assumption, which is satised by most symmetricmodels of
rejection probability (such as linear, logit or probit), would avoid this problem.
Assumption A: P (x) is (weakly) convex whenever P (x)  1
2
.
Let xUAD be an agents optimal proposal when the responder decision
is taken under the UAD, xURD - the same for the URD and xMR - for the MR;
nally let xI be the optimal proposal in the standard one-on-one bargaining.
We can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let assumption A hold. The optimal o¤ers by any weakly risk-
averse (including risk-neutral) individual in each treatment will be ranked as
follows :
xUAD < xI < xMR < xURD; if P (x) >
1
4
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xUAD < xMR < xI < xURD; if P (x) <
1
4
Proof. The proof is done by comparing the rst order conditions.
Since it has been assumed that P (0) = 1;P () = 0, the solution is
interior. Furthermore, assumption A ensures that, as long as P (x)  1
2
, the
rst order conditions are su¢ cient and that there is at most one local maximum
for each voting rule in this range. But for all voting rules, other than UAD,
this must be the global maximum, since the proposer can always ensure the
payo¤ equal to u
 

2

by o¤ering to share the prize equally, which, as has been
discussed above, will always be accepted.
Consider now the optimal o¤er xI in the one-on-one game. Then
u0 (   xI) (1  P (xI)) =  u (   xI)P 0(xI)
Comparing this with the rst order condition for the UAD game, ob-
serve that
u0 (   xI)
 
1  P 3(xI)

>  3u (   xI)P 0 (xI)P 2 (xI)
as long as P (xI) < 1. Since o¤ering a proposal that would spur rejection with
probability one cannot be optimal for the proposer, the inequality must hold.
The right-hand side is decreasing in x, the left is increasing in x, hence to
restore equality x has to be decreased for the optimum in the unanimity (with
acceptance default) case to be achieved. Though unanimity with acceptance
default is the only rule considered here for which the true global maximum
might involve P (x) > 1
2
, that would imply even more aggressive behavior by
the proposers, so that the conclusion that xUAD < xI is maintained.
Similarly, for the URD game
u0 (   xI) (1  P (xI)) <  3u (   xI)P 0 (xI)
and x has to be increased to get to the optimum (unique, since in this case,
as noted above, P (x)  1
2
must hold at the maximum).
We have established that xUAD < xI < xURD. It can be similarly
shown that xUAD < xMR < xURD. To establish the position of xMR vis a vis
xI observe that (taking into account the rst order condition for the individual
case): if P (xI) < 14
u0 (   xI) (1  P (xI)) (1 + 2P (xI)) >  6u (   xI)P 0 (xI)P (xI)
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if P (xI) > 14
u0 (   xI) (1  P (xI)) (1 + 2P (xI)) <  6u (   xI)P 0 (xI)P (xI)
To see the necessary direction of change of x divide both sides of the
previous inequality condition by P (x) > 0 to get
u0 (   xI)
P (xI)
(1  P (xI)) (1 + 2P (xI)) < (>)  6u (   xI)P 0 (xI)
with the left-hand side increasing and the right hand side decreasing in x.
Empirical predictions summarized by the Proposition 1 admit a broad
array of the shapes of u and P . Furthermore, the (weak) risk-aversion and
(weak) convexity of P in the relevant part of the domain are not necessary
and could be further relaxed.
Predictions for the play against the unanimity groups are very straight-
forward; less so with the case of the majority rule. Equilibrium o¤ers depend
on the proposersdegree of risk-aversion and the shape of the rejection prob-
ability P (x), both of which we do not control for in the experiment. Both
o¤ers that face higher and lower rejection probability than 1
4
are likely to be
observed. However, we do have a qualitative prediction in that the less ag-
gressive proposers in the one-on-one treatment should become somewhat more
aggressive when playing against MR groups, while the initially more aggres-
siveproposers are predicted to moderate their behavior somewhat in this case
(though they would still be relatively more aggressive than the initially less
aggressive types).
Our comparative statics prediction on group action is contingent on
the individual rejection probability P (x) being constant across treatments.
Of course, if responders behavior is a¤ected by the fact of being in the group
and/or by the decision rule the group is using, this might not be the case. We
shall explicitly test this assumption in the experimental environment with no
within-group interaction among the responders other than voting itself.
In addition to the four independent design treatments discussed above,
in order to test the models prediction that a less (more) aggressive proposer in
a one-on-one ultimatum bargaining becomes somewhat more (less) aggressive
when playing against groups, we consider two sequential design treatments: in
the rst treatment, a one-on-one ultimatum bargaining is followed by a group-
on-group ultimatum bargaining where the responder groups have to decide
whether to accept using the majority voting rule. In the second treatment,
9
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we reverse the order by having the subjects play majority-rule group-on-group
bargaining game before the one-on-one game.
We conducted three sessions of each of the independent design treat-
ments, but only 1 session of each of the sequential design treatments, with
between 24 and 30 subjects participating in each session Tables 1 and 2 sum-
marize for each experimental design the treatments, the group size, and the
number of subjects per session.
2.1 Design Parameters
This section describes the general experimental procedure.
Participants and Venue. Subjects were drawn from a wide cross
section of undergraduate students at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de Méx-
ico (ITAM) in Mexico City. The recruitment was done from among those
enrolled in introductory classes, in order to avoid those exposed to higher-level
economics courses, such as game theory. Each subject participated in only one
session. The experiment was run at ITAM using computers.
Number of Periods. In order to familiarize subjects with the proce-
dures, two practice periods were conducted before the 10 real (a¤ecting mon-
etary payo¤) periods. For the sequential design, two practice periods were
conducted before the 10 real periods in the rst ultimatum bargaining, and
one practice period was conducted before the 10 real periods in the second
ultimatum bargaining.
Agent Types. For each of the group-on-group treatments, each partic-
ipant was designated as a member of a type A group (i.e., proposers) or a
member of a type B group (i.e., responders). For the one-on-one treatment,
each participant was designated either as a type A agent (i.e., proposer) or as a
type B agent (i.e., responder) before the beginning of the practice periods. All
designations were determined randomly by the computer at the beginning of
the experimental session, and remained constant during the entire session. For
the sequential design, each participant type was determined at the beginning
of a session and preserved across bargaining situations.
Matching Procedure and Group Size. For each of the group-on-group
treatments, membership of each group was changed in a random fashion, so
that each participant formed part of a new group (of the same type) at the
beginning of each period. Each group consisted of three participants. For the
one-on-one treatment, a type A agent was paired with a type B agent, and
each pairing was randomized for each period. Furthermore, agents did not
know who they were paired with in any given period.
10
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Table 1: Independent Design
Experimental Treatments of Group # of Subjects
the Ultimatum Bargaining Size per Session
Standard One-on-One 1 24, 30, 28
Unanimity with Rejection Default 3 30, 30, 30
Unanimity with Acceptance Default 3 30, 30, 30
Majority Rule 3 24 ,30, 30
Table 2: Sequential Design
First Ultimatum Group # of Subjects Second Ultimatum Group # of Subjects
Bargaining Size per Session Bargaining Size per Session
One-on-One 1 28+ Majority Rule 3 24
Majority Rule 3 24 One-on-One 1 24
+: Four subjects were randomly excluded after the one-on-one session in order
to have an even number of groups in the group-on-group ultimatum bargaining.
Bargaining Procedure. Subjects were informed that they had to bargain
over 100 points. For the group-on-group treatments, the task of each pair of
groups was to divide 100 points in each period using the following rules: a)
group A had to make a nal o¤er of points to group B; b) to make a nal
o¤er, each group A member had to write and send an o¤er via computer,
each o¤er being in the range from 0 to 100 points; c) one of these o¤ers was
chosen randomly by the computer as group A nal o¤er to group B; d) upon
receiving the nal o¤er, group B members had to decide whether to accept
or reject the o¤er according to the voting rule announced for this session. No
communication, except as explicitly discussed in this and next paragraph, was
allowed among participants. For the one-on-one treatment a type A agent had
to make and send an o¤er to a type B agent, and after receiving the o¤er, the
type B agent had to decide on his own whether to accept or reject it.
Information Feedback. For the group-on-group treatments, group A
members observed only their own o¤er and the nal o¤er sent to group B.
Group B members observed the nal o¤er, but not the other o¤ers made
by group A members. At the end of each round, members of both groups
were informed whether the nal o¤er was accepted or rejected, the number of
individual acceptance and rejection votes (between 0 and 3) in the responder
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group, and the number of points obtained by their group in that round. For
the one-on-one treatment, each agent learned whether the o¤er was accepted
or rejected and her own amount of points obtained for that round.
Payo¤s. The nal payo¤ for each treatment in the independent design
was determined by randomly selecting one of the 10 real rounds. For the
sequential design, the nal payo¤ for each bargaining situation was determined
by randomly selecting one round out of 10 real periods of each game played.
The pay for the chosen period was calculated as follows: Each group member
got $2.6 Mexican pesos (about 23 US cents) for each point obtained by her
own group, in addition to the basic amount of $20 pesos (roughly US$1.75)
for participation. Thus, each pair of groups e¤ectively bargained over $780
pesos (around US$68 in year 2004 when the rst experimental sessions were
conducted). For the one-on-one treatment, each pair of agents had to bargain
over $260 pesos. In the sequential design one period was chosen for each of
the games played, so that size of the pie was equal to $780 pesos ($260 pesos)
for each game.
3 Experimental Results
This section sees whether the comparative static predictions of the theory are
borne out with the data from the laboratory. In particular, we concentrate
on measuring how di¤erent voting rules a¤ect individual and group rejection
rates and proposals.4
4Tables 6 and 7, at the end, show a summary statistics of the experimental results. In
particular, it describes for the one-on-one treatment the distribution of individual proposals
and rejections aggregated across all ten periods. The o¤er range indicates the amount of
points a proposer is willing to give to a responder. Consider, for example, the o¤er range
from 35 to 39. In the one-on-one treatment, the number of proposals within this range was
86 out of a total of 530 o¤ers, 16.2% (86/530). Likewise, the number of o¤ers in this range
rejected by the responders was 18, resulting in the empirical rejection rate of 20.9% (18/86).
In the same table, we also provide the data for the group-on-group treatments. As in
the one-on-one case, consider the o¤er range from 35 to 39 for the majority rule treatment.
The total number of individual proposals within this range was 77, which makes up 15.1%
of the total of 510 o¤ers in this treatment. Since just 1 out of 3 proposals was randomly
chosen to be sent to a responder group, the group proposals are simply a random selection
of the individual ones. The number of group proposals within this range was 30 out of a
total of 170 o¤ers sent. Therefore, the group o¤ers proportion was 17.6% (30/170). Since
all 3 members of a responder group received the same o¤er, the individual rejection number
within this range was 29; with a total of 90 observations (303), the individual rejection
rate for this range was 32.2% (29/90). At group level, the number of rejections within this
range was 10 out of 30, resulting in a 33.3% (10/30) group rejection rate. At the bottom of
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3.1 Responder Behavior
We begin by checking whether individual voting behavior and group rejection
rates di¤er across treatments, conditional on the o¤er size. In particular, the
model suggests that individual rates of voting for rejection should not di¤er
across di¤erent treatments and that the group rejection rate for unanimity
with rejection default should be higher than for the one-on-one treatment, and
these two higher than for the unanimity with acceptance default. Meanwhile,
majority rule rejection rate should be higher than for the one-on-one treatment
for P (x) < 1=2 and lower, otherwise.
In what follows we separately analyze the individual and group deci-
sions. At individual level, each individual decision to accept (or vote to accept)
or to reject (or vote to reject) a specic o¤er is treated as one decision outcome,
while at group level, a decision outcome is each group decision to accept or
to reject an o¤er. At each level we have a total of six di¤erent treatments for
which we observe rejection behavior: i) decisions to accept/reject by individu-
als who played a one-on-one ultimatum bargaining only;5 ii  iv) decisions by
individuals/groups who played a group-on-group ultimatum bargaining under
a specic voting rule only; v) decisions by individuals who played a one-on-one
ultimatum bargaining having previously experienced playing group-on-group
ultimatum bargaining under the majority voting rule; and vi) decisions by
individuals/groups who played a group-on-group ultimatum bargaining un-
der the majority voting rule having previously experienced playing one-on-one
ultimatum bargaining game.
Subjects played multiple rounds of the bargaining game and each in-
dividuals actions over time are clearly not independent. For this reason, as
well as for comparison with such earlier studies as Bornstein and Yaniv (1998)
and Messick et. al. (1997), in which subjects played the game only once,
we initially attempted to test our hypotheses using only data from a single
period. However, the results of our statistical analysis using data only from
the rst period are inconclusive, as are the results using data from the last
period.6 While we are unable to reject the hypothesis that individual proba-
bilities of voting to reject, conditional on o¤er size, are the same across the
treatments, neither do group rejection probabilities vary across treatments in
a statistically signicant way. But if agentsindividual voting behavior is the
the table some summary statistics are shown for the o¤ers made and rejected.
5Here and in case (v) below, group and individual decisions are, clearly, tautologically
the same.
6Detailed regression results are available from the authors upon request.
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same in di¤erent treatments, this immediately implies that the group outcomes
have to be di¤erent. Simply plugging numbers into a formula in section 2 one
would observe that if the probability of individual voting to reject a given o¤er
is, say 25%, then under unanimity with acceptance default the three-person
group will only reject with less than 2% probability, while the unanimity with
rejection default will result in the rejection probability of nearly 58%. Since
the two sets of coe¢ cients cannot simultaneously be equal to zero, no matter
the actual behavior of individuals, we infer that our sample size is insu¢ cient
to make any conclusions from a single period of observations.7 In what follows
we instead present results of the statistical analysis involving data from all
experimental rounds.8
Table 3 reports estimates of the following two rejection equations at
individual and group level:
Rejectit = 1fIntercept+ offerOfferit
+ urdURD + uadUAD + mrMR
+ expgogEXPGNG+ exponoEXPONO
+ perPer + vi + it  0g (1)
Rejectkt = 1fIntercept+ offerOfferkt
+ urdURD + uadUAD + mrMR
+ mroMROfferkt + expgogEXPGNG+ exponoEXPONO
+ perPer + wk + kt  0g (2)
7One should note, that our sample size is not particularly small by the literature stan-
dards. Thus, Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) have only 20 one-on-one and 20 group-on-group
observations (they only observe nal group decisions). They observe only 2 rejections, mak-
ing it di¢ cult to make conclusions about rejection probabilities. Our failure to establish
signicant results using single-period data also closely parallels that of Slonim and Roth
(1998) in their study of high-stakes ultimatum bargaining. As they discuss in detail, a ma-
jor problem is the lack of exogenous variation of o¤ers, which makes it hard to estimate the
di¤erence in conditional rejection probabilities across treatments from one period data only,
without observing many more subjects than is typical in a laboratory experiment.
8In doing this we have adjusted our statistical analysis for individual-specic e¤ects. We
also report both individual- and group-level results to provide evidence that insignicance
of individual-level coe¢ cients is not merely due to insu¢ cient sample size, as in the single-
period case.
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Table 3: Probability of O¤er Rejection for All Periods: Logit Estimation
Coe¢ cients Individual Group
Intercept 6.214 9.330
(0.711) (1.591)
O¤er -0.230 -0.332
(0.017) (0.046)
Unanimity with Rejection Default 0.643 2.981
(0.605) (0.843)
Unanimity with Acceptance Default 0.310 -2.872
(0.593) (1.016)
Majority Rule 0.265 -3.727
(0.604) (2.137)
MajorityO¤er (-) 0.091
(-) (0.061)
Experienced Group-on-Group Ultimatum Bargaining -0.959 0.343
(0.755) (1.475)
Experienced One-on-One Ultimatum Bargaining -1.908 -1.377
(0.716) (1.301)
Period -0.078 -0.107
(0.030) (0.060)
# of individuals 170 523
# of obs. per individual (min) 10 1
Total # of obs. 1940 1000
Log Likelihood -614.8 -297.3
: p<0.05, : p<0.01 and : p<0.001.
Note: The number in parentheses below each coe¢ cient represents
the coe¢ cient standard error.
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In both equations 1{} is an indicator function that takes the value
of one if the left-hand side of the inequality inside the brackets is greater
than or equal to zero and the value zero otherwise. Model (1) checks whether
di¤erent voting rules a¤ect individual rejection decision in addition to the o¤er
size, where Offerit is the o¤er individual i receives from 0 to 100 at period t.
Model (2) does the same for group rejection decision, where Offerkt is the o¤er
group k receives from 0 to 100 at period t. URD, UAD andMR are dummies
for each of the voting rules; EXPGNG is a dummy for those individuals (or
groups members) who played one-on-one ultimatum bargaining having rst
experienced playing group-on-group ultimatum bargaining under the majority
voting rule; EXPONO is a dummy for those individuals (or groups) who
played group-on-group ultimatum bargaining under the majority voting rule
having rst experienced playing one-on-one ultimatum bargaining; and Per is
a variable for every period, treating time as a continuous variable. We use a
random e¤ect logit model to account for individual and group variability, where
vi and wk are i:i:d:, N(0; 2v) and N(0; 
2
w), respectively. Likewise, it and it
are i:i:d: logistic distributed with mean zero and variance 2 = 
2
 = 
2=3,
independently of vi and wk.
For both models we expect the o¤er size coe¢ cient to be less than zero
(offer < 0 and offer < 0), meaning that the rejection probability should
be lower for higher o¤ers. For model (1), we expect all treatment coe¢ cients
be equal to zero (urd = uad = mr = 0). For model (2), we should expect
that the unanimity treatment coe¢ cients di¤er in sign (urd > 0, uad < 0),
where a positive coe¢ cient should indicate a higher probability of rejection for
a given o¤er than a negative coe¢ cient. This specication takes into account
for majority rule the possibility of higher rejection rates for lower o¤ers and
lower rejection rates for higher o¤ers (mr > 0 and mro < 0).
The rst numerical column in Table 3 shows the estimates of equation
(1). None of the treatment coe¢ cients (urd; uad and mr) in this model
show individual signicance for a p < 0:05. A 2 test indicates that the null
hypothesis of urd = uad = mr = 0 cannot be rejected for a p = 0:82. Our
estimation does show that subjects with experience in one-on-one ultimatum
bargaining game tend to submit lower o¤ers. In addition, a 2 test indicates
that the null hypothesis of expgog = expono = 0 cannot be rejected for a
p = 0:39. On the other hand, time-period coe¢ cient being di¤erent from zero
can be rejected for a p = 0:003. This indicates that players are willing to
reduce the probability of rejection over time. Finally, a 2 test indicates that
the null hypothesis of the voting rules, experience and time period coe¢ cients
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being jointly equal to zero can be rejected for a p < 0:0001. This result
indicates that this model performs better than a specication that does not
include these variables, indicating a possible role, at least, for experience and
time period in explaining individual rejection probabilities.9
The last column in Table 3 shows the same estimates of equation (2).
The o¤er size coe¢ cient (offer) is correct in sign and signicant. Likewise, the
coe¢ cients for both unanimity treatments (urd and uad) are signicant and
have the expected signs. In particular, under URD the rejection probability
increases by 19:3%, while under UAD it increases by 8%. On the other hand,
the majority rule coe¢ cients (mr and mro) exhibit opposite signs to what was
expected, though the 2 test result indicates that the null hypothesis of mr =
mro = 0 cannot be rejected (p = 0:134), indicating that we cannot really
distinguish between the on-on-one and the group-on-group majority voting rule
treatment in terms of rejection probability. Overall, a 2 test result indicates
that the null hypothesis of urd = uad = mr = mro = 0 can be rejected for a
p < 0:0001, favoring the joint signicance of these treatment variables. None
of the experience treatment and time-period coe¢ cients show individual (or
joint) signicance for a p < 0:05. Thus, experience and time do not contribute
to explaining group rejection rate variations. Finally, a 2 test indicates that
the null hypothesis of the voting rules, experience and time period coe¢ cients
being jointly equal to zero can be rejected for a p < 0:0001. This result
indicates that this model performs better than a specication that does not
include these variables.10
Summing up, the rejection probability estimations using the data set
from all ten periods show how di¤erent voting rules a¤ect individual and group
responses in ultimatum bargaining. On one hand, individuals tend to respond
by voting in the same way whether they are deciding within a group or alone,
which supports our model, as developed in the theory section. In particular,
it suggests that we are justied in modeling agents as only caring about the
distribution of monetary payo¤s. On the other hand, di¤erent voting rules
a¤ect group rejection probabilities as expected. Not surprisingly, smaller o¤ers
result in higher rejection probability. Finally, we observe that time does matter
in predicting individual behavior. In particular, the same o¤ers are less likely
9A likelihood-ratio test for this regression that compares the pooled with the panel esti-
mator rejects the null hypothesis that panel-level variance component is unimportant for a
p < 0:0001.
10A likelihood-ratio test for this regression that compares the pooled with the panel esti-
mator rejects the null hypothesis that panel-level variance component is unimportant for a
p < 0:0001.
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Table 4: Proposer Behavior
Coe¢ cients Proposals
Intercept 40.127
(1.390)
Unanimity with Rejection Default 3.677
(1.823)
Unanimity with Acceptance Default 1.873
(1.930)
Majority Rule -3.637
(2.004)
Period -0.119
(0.096)
URDPeriod 0.098
(0.141)
UADPeriod -0.645
(0.140)
MRPeriod 0.168
(0.138)
# of Obs. 1910
: p<0.05, : p<0.01 and : p<0.001.
Note: The number in parentheses below each coe¢ cient
represent the coe¢ cient standard error.
to be rejected over time. Finally, subjectsexperience playing as a members
of a group (or as individuals) does not inuence rejection rates when playing
as individuals (or as a members of a group). We conclude that our qualitative
comparative static predictions for the rejection probabilities seem to hold.
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3.2 Proposer Behavior
Given the di¤erences in group rejection probabilities for di¤erent voting rules,
we should expect changes in o¤ers across treatments. We consider the following
specication to estimate whether the size of o¤ers di¤ers across treatments for
all periods:
Offerit = Intercept+ urdURD + uadUAD + mrMR + perPer
+ perurdPer  URD + peruadPer  UAD + permrPer MR + vi + it (3)
where Offeri is the o¤er proposer i sent from 0 to 100. We expect the o¤er
size coe¢ cient for unanimity with rejection default to be greater than zero
(urd > 0), meaning that compared to the one-on-one treatment proposers
should be willing to o¤er more given the high rejection probability behind
this voting rule. For unanimity with acceptance default, we should expect
a coe¢ cient less than zero (uad < 0), which means that compared to the
one-on-one treatment proposers should be willing to o¤er less given the low
probability of rejection. Compared to the one-on-one treatment, proposers
facing majority rule should be willing to o¤er less when P (x) < 1
4
and more
otherwise. Therefore, it is di¢ cult to predict the coe¢ cient sign associated
to this treatment.11 We use a random e¤ect model to account for individual
variability, where vi is the random disturbance characterizing the ith individual
and is constant through time and it is the random disturbance that varies
independently across time and individuals. This specication allows also the
possibility of a di¤erent dynamic within each treatment.12
11We also considered a specication introducing dummies for subjects who experience
making o¤ers under di¤erent bargaining situations. However, the corresponding coe¢ cients
were not jointly di¤erent from zero for a p < 0:05.
12In the one-on-one and majority rule treatments, three subjects reported in the post-
session questionnaire initial confusion about the meaning of the o¤er (i.e., whether it was
the o¤er to the responder or the fraction retained by the proposer that was being sent).
These same three subjects submitted o¤ers far in excess of 50%, apparently under the
impression that they were doing the opposite. Thus, in the one-on-one treatment such a
subject o¤ered 100 for 8 consecutive periods and then 45 twice (possibly, upon realization of
the mistake). We believe this behavior conrms the self-reported initial misunderstanding
of the instructions by the subject in question. Consequently, we decided to exclude all of
his proposals, leaving us with 520 individual o¤ers out of a total of 530. Likewise, in the
majority rule treatment there was a subject who for 5 periods in a row o¤ered over 90,
followed this by an o¤er of 50 and then 4 o¤ers of less than 15; and another subject who
o¤ered 5 times more than 90, twice between 70 and 80, twice 50 and concluded with an o¤er
of 1 in the nal round. After excluding these two subjectso¤ers, we consider 490 individual
o¤ers out of a total of 510 individual o¤ers. When these o¤ers were included, predictably,
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Table 4 shows the results of the random e¤ect estimation. Our estima-
tion shows that the time period coe¢ cient (period) is signicant for a p < 0:001,
implying that proposers were willing to o¤er less over time. The unanimity
with rejection default coe¢ cient is positive and di¤erent from zero (p < 0:05),
indicating that proposers tend to o¤er more than in the one-on-one treatment.
The signs of the majority rule and unanimity with acceptance default coe¢ -
cients are not signicantly di¤erent from zero for a p = 0:42 and p = 0:33,
respectively. However, a 2 test result indicates that the null hypothesis of
urd = uad = mr = 0 can be rejected for a p < 0:001. Our specication
allows for a di¤erence in the dynamic within each treatment. A 2 test result
indicates that the null hypothesis of perurd = peruad = permr = 0 can be
rejected for a p < 0:001, conrming the presence of such di¤erence. In fact,
peruad is clearly negative (signicance at p < 0:001), which, compared with
the insignicant sign of uad, suggests that agents may be moving towards a
correct response.13
Summing up the results, our estimations indicate that o¤ers decrease
over time; o¤ers are higher for the unanimity with rejection default than for
other treatments; o¤ers are not signicantly di¤erent for the other two voting
rules compared to the control treatment; and o¤ers decrease over time in the
unanimity with acceptance default.
3.2.1 One-on-One vs. Group-on-Group Majority Rule
Sequential treatment was designed to try to distinguish between the one-on-
one and majority group behavior. The same individuals were proposers in
both the one-on-one and majority rule games and our model suggests that we
should expect the same participants to make di¤erent individual o¤ers in the
two bargaining situations. To test this hypothesis we consider the following
specication:
they moved the average of the individual treatment benchmark up, which made the URD
e¤ects less signicant (signicance surviving only at 6% level), but the UAD e¤ects more
signicant than reported in what follows. For both unanimity treatments, no subjects o¤ers
were excluded.
13From the raw data we observe that in the unanimity with acceptance default treatment
proposers were exposed to a higher-than-expected number of actual group rejections in early
rounds (this di¤erence was not statistically signicant), possibly making them cautious about
aggressive o¤ers. The sign of the peruad suggests that, as the impact of those early rejections
wore o¤, the proposers did start to be more aggressive, as predicted by the model.
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Table 5: Group-on-Group Majority Rule vs. One-on-One Ultimatum Bargain-
ing
Coe¢ cients Average O¤er MR
Intercept 21.275
(6.066)
Average O¤er ONO 0.521
(0.145)
# of Obs. 24
: p<0.05, : p<0.01 and : p<0.001.
OfferMRit = + Offer
ONO
it + vi + it
where OfferMRit is the average o¤er proposer i made under the group-on-
group ultimatum bargaining where the receiver group have to decide whether
to accept under the majority voting rule and OfferONOit is the average o¤er
proposer i made in the one-on-one ultimatum bargaining. We should expect
the o¤er size coe¢ cient under the one-on-one ultimatum bargaining be greater
than zero and less than one (1 >  > 0), meaning that those individuals that
were less (more) aggressive as proposer in a one-on-one ultimatum bargaining
becomes somewhat more (less) aggressive when playing against groups, and
vice versa.14 Table 5 shows estimation for this specication.15 Our estimation
shows that average o¤er coe¢ cient () is signicant for a p < 0:001. We could
reject the null hypothesis that this coe¢ cient was greater than or equal to one
(less than or equal to zero) for a p < 0:001. This result is consistent with the
expected changes in the individual average o¤ers across bargaining situations.
Figure 1 shows for each individual his/her average o¤ers under each of the
bargaining situations (note our regression crossing the 45 line).16
14This does not mean that agents aggressiveness rankingshould switch - the same agents
would be making relatively high (respectively, relatively low) o¤ers in both situations.
15We also evaluated another model specication, where a dummy variable for the order in
which agents played the games is considered. For this specication, we could not reject the
null hypothesis that this coe¢ cient was di¤erent from zero for a p = 0:41. Therefore, the
order in which agents nd themselves in di¤erent bargaining situations does not contribute
to explaining o¤er variation.
16We also consider another specication where we included a dummy variable for control-
ing the order of the treatment. This dummy was not signicant, so we decided to drop it
from our estimation.
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Figure 1: Average Individual O¤ers
4 Conclusions
In this paper we provide a comparison between four di¤erent treatments of
ultimatum bargaining: the one-on-one bargaining and three di¤erent group-
on-group games di¤erentiated by the controlled decision rule used on the re-
sponder side to agree on acceptance or rejection. In the latter three treatments
the group members share the outcome of the bargaining, but are completely
isolated in a setting which minimizes the possibility of them forming any sort
of true group ties or within-group strategic interactions. The results of our
experiments seem to support the following conclusions:
Firstly, we cannot reject the hypothesis that individual responder be-
havior is the same in all four treatments. The absence of di¤erence between the
behavior inside and outside the group suggests that sharing in the outcomes,
on its own, might not be su¢ cient to form any group feelings that might a¤ect
individual behavior. Of course, the individual responder behavior does gen-
erate the predictable and (in this case, statistically signicant) di¤erences in
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their o¤ers depending on the treatment.
Secondly, we can reject the hypothesis that the proposer behavior is
the same in all four treatments. In particular, in the unanimity with rejection
default treatment proposers are clearly substantially more cautious than in
other treatments, which indicates that they correctly respond to the increased
di¢ culty of obtaining acceptance of their proposals. We also observe di¤er-
ences in proposersbehavior between the one-on-one bargaining and the other
treatments of group bargaining. In particular, while in the unanimity with
acceptance default treatment we fail to observe proposers to be on average
more aggressive initially, we do observe them becoming more aggressive with
time. One reason for this delay may be that, though the observed di¤erence
in responder behavior between the unanimity with acceptance default and the
one-on-one treatments is not statistically signicant, the realization of the in-
dividual conditional rejection probability in this treatment happened to be
somewhat high.
group responder behavior, which creates incentives for the proposers to adjust
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Table 6: Summary of Experimental Results: One-on-One and MR Group-on-group Treatments
O¤er One-on-One Majority Rule
Range Ind . O¤. Ind . Rej. Ind . O¤. G rp. O¤. Ind . Rej. G rp . Rej.
> 50 2.8 0.0 5.7 4.7 0.0 0.0
(15) (0) (29) (8) (0) (0)
= 50 11.5 1.6 11.0 13.5 2.9 0.0
(61) (1) (56) (23) (2) (0)
45 - 49 18.1 5.2 18.4 16.5 7.1 3.6
(96) (5) (94) (28) (6) (1)
40 - 44 28.3 7.3 21.8 18.8 17.7 9.4
(150) (11) (111) (32) (17) (3)
35 - 39 16.2 20.9 15.1 17.6 32.2 33.3
(86) (18) (77) (30) (29) (10)
30 - 34 9.1 12.5 10.4 8.8 24.4 20.0
(48) (6) (53) (15) (11) (3)
25 - 29 8.3 38.6 12.0 11.8 30.0 25.0
(44) (17) (61) (20) (18) (5)
< 25 5.7 80.0 5.7 8.2 57.1 64.3
(30) (24) (29) (14) (24) (9)
All O¤. 100.0 15.5 100.0 100.0 21.0 18.2
(530) (82) (510) (170) (107) (31)
Statistics
Avg. 40 27 40 40 31 28
Med. 40 30 40 40 35 31
s.d. 12 12 13 15 11 11
Note: Numbers represent percentage of o¤ers within each range.
The number in parentheses below each percentage represents
the number of times the occurrence was observed.
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Table 7: Summary of Experimental Results: URD and UAD Group-on-group Treatments
O¤er Unanimity with Rejection Default Unanimity with Acceptance Default
Range Ind . O¤. G rp. O¤. Ind . Rej. G rp . Rej. Ind . O¤. G rp O¤. Ind . Rej. G rp . Rej.
> 50 11.1 9.3 0.0 0.0 8.4 8.7 2.6 0.0
(50) (14) (0) (0) (38) (13) (1) (0)
= 50 14.7 10.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 3.3 0.0 0.0
(66) (15) (0) (0) (11) (5) (0) (0)
45 - 49 32.7 36.7 5.5 16.4 13.8 16.7 4.0 36.0
(147) (55) (9) (9) (62) (25) (3) (9)
40 - 44 20.2 20.0 14.4 30.0 24.4 26.0 9.4 2.6
(91) (30) (13) (9) (110) (39) (11) (1)
35 - 39 8.2 8.7 20.5 46.2 23.8 18.7 25.0 14.3
(37) (13) (8) (6) (107) (28) (21) (4)
30 - 34 8.9 10.0 40.0 80.0 11.6 12.7 54.4 15.8
(40) (15) (18) (12) (52) (19) (31) (3)
25 - 29 2.2 2.7 75.0 100.0 6.7 4.0 44.4 16.7
(10) (4) (9) (4) (30) (6) (8) (1)
< 25 2.2 2.7 91.7 100.0 8.9 10.0 64.4 33.3
(9) (4) (11) (4) (40) (15) (29) (5)
All O¤. 100.0 100.0 15.1 29.3 100.0 100.0 23.1 15.3
(450) (150) (68) (44) (450) (150) (104) (23)
Statistics
Avg. 44 43 31 34 38 39 29 28
Med. 45 45 30 35 39 40 30 33
s.d. 10 10 12 10 11 12 11 10
Note: Numbers represent percentage of o¤ers within each range. The number
in parentheses below each percentage represents the number of times
the occurrence was observed.
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Appendix: Experimental Instructions
The following is the verbatim translation (from Spanish into English) of exper-
imental instructions administered to subjects at ITAM (the Spanish original
is available from the authors upon request).
Instructions Group-on-Group
This is an experiment about decision-making. The instructions are simple and
if you follow them carefully and take good decisions, you can earn a CONSID-
ERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY, which will be PAID YOU IN CASH at the
end of the experiment.
General Proceedings
In this experiment you will participate as a member of a GROUP A or a
GROUP B. Your participation as a part of one of these two groups shall be
determined at the beginning of the experiment and will be constant during the
entire session. Each group shall consist solely of three (3) participants.
The experiment shall consist of 12 periods: two practice periods, and
10 periods played for money, one of which shall be randomly selected at the
end of the experiment to determine your nal pay. For this reason you should
consider each period as if it were the chosen periodfor your pay.
At the beginning of each period, each TYPE A GROUP will interact
with a TYPE B GROUP. The formation of pairs of GROUPS A and B will
be done randomly. Likewise, the membership composition of each group will
change in a random fashion, so that each participant will form a part of a new
GROUP (of the same type) at the beginning of each period.
Specic Proceedings
In each period the task of each pair of groups is to try to divide 100 points
using the following rules.
1) The members of GROUP A must make an o¤er of points to members
of GROUP B.
1.1) To make the nal o¤er from GROUP A to GROUP B each member
of GROUP A must write and send an o¤er via the computer. Each o¤er must
be in the range of 0 to 100 points.
1.2) After that, one of these o¤ers made shall be chosen randomly by
the computer as the nal o¤er of GROUP A to GROUP B.
2) The nal o¤er of GROUP A shall be sent to each member of GROUP
B. After observing the o¤er sent, the members of GROUP B must decide if
they accept of reject the o¤er according to the following rule:
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The o¤er is considered accepted when every one of the members of the
group votes to accept it. Otherwise it is considered rejected.17
2.1) If GROUP B rejects the o¤er, no GROUP receives any pay.
2.2) If GROUP B accepts the o¤er, the GROUP A receives the amount
of 100 points minus the points o¤ered to GROUP B. In its turn, GROUP B
receives the amount of points which has been o¤ered by GROUP A.
3) Once taken, the decision to accept or reject the o¤er of points is
nal, no counter-o¤er shall be possible, and the next period shall start with
a new grouping of participants for each group type.
Payment Proceedings
Once the 10 periods played for money are over, one of them will be chosen
randomly to determine the nal pay. For this reason, you should consider each
period as if it were nal chosen periodfor your pay.
The pay for the chosen period shall be calculated as follows: Each
member of each group shall get $2.6 pesos for each point obtained by the
group to which shenhe belongs, in addition to the basic amount of $20 pesos
for participation.
At the end of the session, each of the participants shall be called by the
identication number assigned by the computer at the beginning of the exper-
iment to receive his/her pay in a sealed envelope, thus ensuring the complete
anonymity of his/her decisions and their results.
Instructions One-on-One
This is an experiment about decision-making. The instructions are simple and
if you follow them carefully and take good decisions, you can earn a CONSID-
ERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY, which will be PAID YOU IN CASH at the
end of the experiment.
General Proceedings
In this experiment you will participate as a TYPE A or TYPE B AGENT.
17This corresponds to Unanimity with rejection default; instructions for other
treatments are as follows.
Unanimity with acceptance default:
The o¤er is considered rejected when every one of the members of the group
votes to accept it. Otherwise it is considered accepted.
Majority rule:
The o¤er is considered accepted when at least two of the members of the group
vote to accept it. Otherwise it is considered rejected.
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Your participation as one of these agent types shall be determined at the
beginning of the experiment and will be constant during the entire session
The experiment shall consist of 12 periods: two practice periods, and
10 periods played for money, one of which shall be randomly selected at the
end of the experiment to determine your nal pay. For this reason you should
consider each period as if it were the chosen periodfor your pay.
At the beginning of each period, each TYPE A AGENT will interact
with a TYPE B AGENT. The formation of pairs of TYPE A and TYPE B
AGENTS will be done randomly.
Specic Proceedings
In each period the task of each pair of agents is to try to divide 100 points
using the following rules.
1) Each TYPE A AGENT must make an o¤er of points to a TYPE B
AGENT. For this each TYPE A AGENT must write and send an o¤er via the
computer. Each o¤er must be in the range of 0 to 100 points.
2) After observing the o¤er sent by the TYPE A AGENT, the TYPE
B AGENT must decide if shenhe accepts or rejects it.
2.1) If the TYPE B AGENT rejects the o¤er, no AGENT receives any
pay.
2.2) If TYPE B AGENT accepts the o¤er, the TYPE A AGENT re-
ceives the amount of 100 points minus the points o¤ered to TYPE B AGENT.
In its turn, TYPE B AGENT receives the amount of points which has been
o¤ered by TYPE A AGENT.
3) Once taken, the decision to accept or reject the o¤er of points is
nal, no counter-o¤er shall be possible, and the next period shall start with
a new grouping of agent pairs.
Payment Proceedings
Once the 10 periods played for money are over, one of them will be chosen
randomly to determine the nal pay. For this reason you should consider each
period as if it were nal chosen periodfor your pay.
The pay for the chosen period shall be calculated as follows: Each agent
shall get $2.6 pesos for each point obtained, in addition to the basic amount
of $20 pesos for participation.
At the end of the session, each of the participants shall be called by the
identication number assigned by the computer at the beginning of the exper-
iment to receive his/her pay in a sealed envelope, thus ensuring the complete
anonymity of his/her decisions and their results.
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* * *
In the sequential treatment, after the completion of the rst 10 rounds
the subjects were asked to move to a next-door classroom, while the computers
were being reinitialized. The subjects were monitored throughout and no
communication was allowed. When the subjects returned to the room where
the experiment was being conducted, the appropriate instructions were read
to them in their entirety before proceeding.
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